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Selecting economic institutions, I will argue, may very well be, in most if not all 
countries, the most critical area of economic policy making and yet it has been 
decades since it held center stage. A surface cause is that our understanding of 
institutions is relatively meager. A deeper reason is that it has been hard even to 
get started: We cannot have a reasoned discussion of the performance of 
institutions and the selection among them – which institutions are working well, 
which must be altered, and which new ones brought in – until we are willing and 
able to specify (for the sake of argument at any rate) the kind of economy we 
desire to have. Here I want to propose a conception of the kind of economy that 
economic policy making would do well to aim for – a notion of the desirable 
economy.1 Such a conception can serve as the moral criterion for choosing among 
alternative structures of economic institutions. It also serves to put the whole 
discussion of economic policy in a somewhat new perspective. 
 
The criterion most often used, implicitly or explicitly, in policy discussion 
is the static efficiency criterion applied in neoclassical economics and utilized in 
neoliberal/supply-side analyses of economic policy. In this doctrine, the focus is 
on incentives to work, to save and to invest; and economic policies are judged by 
their disincentive effects on these decisions. We have all assimilated this 
neoclassical message, of course, the radical postwar Keynesianism being a thing 
of the past. We understand that countries can cause considerable mischief through 
misjudged settings of various policy parameters – excessive marginal tax rates, 
prohibitive replacement ratios, and so forth. The neoclassical/neoliberal/supply-
side critique of the continental western European economies, however, goes 
farther, much farther: It states that, in fact, these mis-tunings of policy parameters 
are causing – indeed they are the main cause of – the low employment and 
growth slowdown there. (See Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991.2) 
 
I do not want to insinuate that this neoclassical analysis is without merit 
or that it makes no contribution at all to accounting for the relative stagnation still 
present on the Continent and in Japan. My own work, for that matter, has taken 
                                                          
*  McVickar Professor of Political Economy, Columbia University. I gratefully acknowledge some 
recent collaborations with Gylfi Zoega in this research area. 
1  This abstracts from matters of economic justice. A desirable economic system might be run justly 
or unjustly from some standpoint but might be more preferable to other systems in either case. 
2  I suggested that market forces were at least as important if not more so, such as the extraordinary 
elevation of real interest rates in the 1980s (Phelps, 1992) and the slowdown, apparent by the late 
1970s, of productivity in Europe and, to a much lesser extent, the U.S. (Hoon and Phelps, 1997). 
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account of the effects of tax rates on labor income, especially the short-run 
effects.3 (Phelps, 1994). It has also placed much emphasis, perhaps more than is 
warranted, on employment and unemployment effects of a bloated level of 
welfare-state entitlements. (Phelps and Zoega, 1997) By now, a wide range of 
policy influences on economic activity and on growth have been indicted. (See 
Heckman,4 2004) So, while insisting that any assessment is subject to uncertainty, 
I agree that some appreciable part of the sag in activity and the slowdown in 
productivity in western continental Europe from the early 1980s onward and in 
Japan from the early 1990s, results from these and other mis-tunings. The open 
question is the degree of importance of these neoclassical policy shocks. It could 
be that the estimated part played by escalating welfare entitlements and 
successive tax hikes in statistical explanations of the rise of unemployment on the 
Continent in the 1980s and 1990s relative to the United States is largely the result 
of a spurious correlation of those forces with the slowdown of technical progress, 
unfavorable demographic developments looming in the future and other 
influences – not all of which are easy to implement in statistical analyses. If we 
look at the cross section of nations belonging to the OECD we do not find that 
inter-country differences in unemployment and labor-force participation rates are 
appreciably explained by differences in the tax rate on labor, the replacement ratio 
and the size of the public sector.5  
 
My complaint is that economic policymaking has gone from seeing 
neoclassical analysis as having a necessary place to regarding it as sufficient. 
Efficiency has gone from being an element of the good economy to being the sole 
criterion. The preponderance of actual and proposed reforms in Europe in the past 
few years have seldom looked beyond re-adjustments in the fine tuning of the 
neoclassical instruments: tax rates, social contributions and public expenditures. 
Believing the inflated welfare state to be the main problem, some countries are 
planning to retract it a notch, starting with expansions of the contribution time – 
in Italy, from 35 years to 40. Seeing high income tax rates as a big problem, some 
countries plan cuts – in Germany, by 10 percentage points, in France by 9 points. 
Believing that the replacement ratio in unemployment benefits to be crucial, some 
countries plan to scale it back – in France, to shorten the duration.6 Believing that 
a shortage of infrastructure is also at fault for Europe’s ills, the European 
Commission plans a program of increased bridges and tunnels – two billion euro’s 
worth within 10 years. It is almost laughable that policy planners would suppose 
these modest, incremental policy reforms could be sufficient to make a noticeable 
difference in employment or in productivity growth. The deeper point, however, 
is that these responses show no deep or original thought about what constitutes a 
well-performing economy. So let me give my view on that matter and go on to 
discuss some preliminary, but suggestive, findings. 
                                                          
3  Holding constant the other tax rates, such as the rate on non-labor incomes. 
4  In part, Heckman’s scrutiny extends to some of the economic institutions that I have been writing 
about very recently (Phelps, 2003) and will be here. 
5  Perhaps a multiple regression analysis would enable us to tease out some satisfactory results. 
6  These points were made in a column by me (Phelps, 2003b) and independently by another 




The Desirable Economy: High Performance as Productivity and Prosperity 
What is wanted in policy discussion is an explicit conception of economic 
performance – of what a desirable business life is. Clearly, working-age people 
want a wide range of careers open to them. That in turn requires that wage rates 
be high in a wide range of jobs, hence a high-productivity economy. (Establishing 
a generous level of entitlements, such as the demogrants and tuition-free 
education for all, would permit people to choose the work they like regardless of 
how low the relative pay is; the difficulty would be that the high-productivity 
work needed to generate the tax revenues to pay for such entitlements would not 
generally be chosen.) Another point here is that active-age people need conditions 
in which they can function: to be able to think, to work and rest, and so forth. 
These conditions in turn require that people to be able to afford adequate space 
around them, protection from severe cold and severe heat at home and at work; 
and affording these things requires high productivity. Nevertheless, high 
productivity is just one element of good economic performance. 
 
For an economy to be said to be performing well its participants also need 
to be prospering. Prosperity means the available jobs are engaging and rewarding 
in more than pecuniary ways. It means the availability of work enlisting the minds 
of the jobholders, offering challenges in problem solving, leading them to 
discover some of their talents and causing them to expand their abilities. The 
personal growth that comes from the discovery and development of talents is 
basic to what is often called job satisfaction. Clearly this prosperity is an end in 
itself, not merely an instrument to a high level of economic activity. Yet, job 
satisfaction has knock-on effects such as promoting high participation in the labor 
force; also, a high level of employee morale, or loyalty, serves to lower 
unemployment and thus add to the availability of such good jobs. So the degree of 
prosperity may be rather well proxied by some relatively well-measured things 
like the level of business activity – the participation rate (L/P), the unemployment 
rate ((L- N)/L) and the activity rate (N/P). 
 
If that is our conception of a good business life – problem-solving and 
discovery of talents, which in turn rest on the economy’s dynamism, it is hard to 
see why the neoclassical preoccupations with disincentives should be accorded 
center stage. Correcting the calibrations of tax rates, social contributions and 
public expenditures will not make resources more productive. And it will not 
make jobs more engaging and more rewarding. That is basically why the plan to 
add to the stock of bridges and tunnels strikes us as a sort of joke, even if we 
cannot put our finger right away on why it is funny. It seems unlikely that more 
bridges and tunnels on the Continent will contribute measurably to the sense of 
prosperity that those countries are so acutely and visibly missing. 
 
Is it the generally accepted conception of high performance, though? In 
Europe? Or anywhere? The notion of high economic performance, of the 
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desirable economy, that I have just outlined is commonly said to be peculiar to the 
United States.7 Probably many readers will feel that this notion of performance – 
more broadly, the elevation of work and business – does resonate in varying 
degrees and respects with some memorable American writers, among them 
Franklin, Emerson, Lincoln, William James, John Dewey, John Rawls, Richard 
Rorty and Derek Curtis Bok.8 Nevertheless, the commonly held impression that 
this conception of high performance is foreign to European values is unfounded. 
Quite the contrary. 
 
The humanist thesis that discovery, independence, enterprise and 
participation are the route to personal development and achievement was, after 
all, first articulated and developed by Europeans. This humanism grew out of 
ancient Greece, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. Aristotle, in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, starts from the premise that “all men desire knowledge” and 
goes on to discuss the relations among work, learning, development, enjoyment 
and happiness. Cellini in his Autobiography is the prototype of the liberated 
individualist bent on accomplishment and succcess. Smith propounds the social 
value of self-help and competition, and he champions broad participation in such 
a business life. Say extols entrepreneurs as constantly reinventing the economy in 
their quest for higher yields and Condorcet elevates the productivity of these 
economic entrepreneurs over the zero-sum results of political entrepreneurs vying 
for political favor.9 Evidently American values derive from this European 
thought. And this line of thought goes on beyond the 18th century. In later 
centuries, Henri Bergson sees the potential for change as the elan vital and the 
good life as one of constant “becoming” rather than mere “being.” Marshall 
dwells on the workplace as the source of most of people’s mental activity and 
Myrdal views jobs as soon to be a richer source of most people’s satisfaction than 
their consumption. 
 
Why, then, is it rather widely surmised that Europeans revolted long ago 
against these core Western values? Such a revolt is inferred from the fact that, in 
the early decades of the 20th century, much of Continent turned away from the 
vibrant capitalism of 1913: eastern Europe choose communism, later market 
socialism, while two western European nations, Italy and Spain, invented and 
installed corporatism. But a majority of the proponents of each of these counter-
movements supported it on the argument that this system was superior to 
capitalism in its ability to generate investment and harness science for progress, 
thus economic growth, and superior also in the offering jobs that engaged the 
mind and enlarged the responsibilities of the worker. The suggestion that the 
humanist tradition is foreign to European values and unique to American ones is 
therefore not historical and much exaggerated. 
                                                          
7  This was remarked (in passing) in a comment at the conference by Ralph Gomory. At the time I 
did not disagree, if I remember correctly. But I am begging to differ somewhat now. 
8  During his American years (at Harvard, where he is again) Amartya Sen distilled much of this 
literature, making “doing things” and “capabilities” central to freedom and justice. 
9  See p. 33 in Rothschild (2001), a book in which Condorcet is prominent. 
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What is sometimes suggested, however, is that there has been a considerable 
erosion in the influence of these values on the behavior of typical Europeans. In 
Europe, the observation goes, people work to live and in America people live to 
work. It is suggested that that more than a century of anti-business sentiment, 
some of it the result of Christian teaching, some of it an exasperation with 
fluctuations and inequality, has weakened the force of the old Western values.10 
The questions raised here have all the makings of a great debate. What is it that is 
the main source of the prosperity deriving from a nation’s economy? Is it certain 
economic institutions – the presence of some and the avoidance of others? Or is it 
culture? Or what? Or is it maybe a vast panorama of things? But before we can 
even touch on that subject we need to take some further steps. 
 
 
Prosperity Depends on an Economy’s Dynamism, Maybe Productivity Too 
What must be present for an economy to offer this prosperity, which is so 
important an element of high performance? At one level, I would say the answer 
is that there must be productive change, which I call “dynamism.” First, for the 
employed to be prospering there must be the stimulus and challenge of change 
going on in the workplace – hence new problems to be solved, new tasks to be 
mastered, new abilities to strive for. Second, and less obviously, a country does 
not want misguided or pointless change; it wants investments that appear to the 
financial sector to have good prospects of creating productive change, that is, 
gains in productivity. 
 
Is there any empirical support for that thesis? In the late 1990s I realized 
there was circumstantial evidence unfolding that some countries had lower levels 
of dynamism than others and that the countries inferred to have low dynamism 
showed signs of poor economic performance – low prosperity, in particular, 
whether or not also low productivity. When the internet and communications 
revolution broke out, some nations went into an investment boom and some were 
barely responsive. Of the 12 large OECD economies, three looked to be low in 
dynamism: Germany and Italy missed the investment boom and France was very 
late to it. I realized that these same three economies had also been showing signs 
of poor rewards in the workplace and poor morale as a result (relative to the other 
9 economies): these signs included low labor-force participation and high 
unemployment. 
 
Does the productivity, the other element of performance, also depend on 
dynamism? Here the evidence is mixed, to say the least. The fact that an the UK 
economy shows significant responsiveness at least occasionally to market 
                                                          
10  Americans were not as exposed to an anti-materialist strain in some Christian teaching, were not 
racked by wars to the degree the Europeans were, and less inclined to see inequality as 
disequalifying when economic growth appeared to promise so much. I don’t know whether these 
stabs at an explanation are convincing. (Europe was similarly cut off from America’s pragmatist 
school of philosophy, 1880 to 1930.) 
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opportunities, which is a sign of some dynamism, and yet appears to have 
relatively low productivity next to the levels in France and Germany, which show 
relatively little sign of dynamism, may be an indication that relatively high 
dynamism is not sufficient for relatively high productivity. (The other possibility, 
of course, is that the data of the late 1990s have misled me into grouping the UK 
among the economies with relatively high dynamism. Gordon Brown, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer in Britain, remarked that Britain did not have a boom in the late 
1990s, contrary to my calculation.) 
 
The fact that both France and Germany have relatively high productivity in 
the set of 12 large OECD countries I have twice referred to may indicate that 
relatively high responsiveness, thus relatively high dynamism, is not necessary for 
relatively high productivity. A familiar characterization of Europe, after all, is that 
it owes its high productivity to its clever imitation of what is proven to work in 
the US after the heavy costs of innovation and the frequent experience of failure. 
In fact, when some rough allowance is made for the rather poor rates of inclusion 
of various disadvantaged workers from jobs in the French economy, it is not at all 
clear that France does rank relatively high in productivity. In any case, this whole 
matter has to be left to future research. 
 
 
An Economy’s Dynamism Depends on its Economic Institutions 
How is a country to generate this dynamism on which prosperity depends? 
My thesis in this connection is that the degree of dynamism in a nation’s 
economy hinges on its development of some key economic institutions – 
company law and corporate governance, the population’s preparation for 
business life, the development of financial instruments such as the stock 
market and so forth. Such general institutions as the rule of law and 
provision of enough personal and national security to safeguard earning, 
saving and investing are needed for any market economy, even market 
socialism; they are insufficient for dynamism. To say that is in no way to 
depreciate the pioneering work of Douglass North bringing out the paralysis 
of an economy not supported by property rights; neither is it to depreciate 
the imaginative research by Andrei Shleifer confirming the large 
explanatory power enjoyed by some of the property rights he studies. It is 
only to say that there is more to dynamism than what North introduced and 
Shleifer tested and reinforced. The North-Shleifer thesis is based on 
classical considerations and my additions are modernist, resting on actors’ 
imperfect knowledge. The contrast between ballet traditions drawn by 
Twyla Tharp applies here: “Modern is classical plus more.” 
 
Evidence exists for this thesis on sources of dynamism too. We could have 
predicted very well (even as early as 1990) the ranking of the 12 large countries 
by the strength of their booms, if any – thus how they were going to rank over the 
late 1990s in terms of the dynamism they are inferred to have – simply from 
knowing how they ranked (in 1988 or 1990, say) by the percentage of the 
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population with a university degree, the OECD index of licenses required for 
opening new businesses and the breadth of the stock exchange as proxied by the 
market value of the shares outstanding (relative to GDP). 
 
The two pieces of evidence I have brought up, the first linking circumstantial 
evidence of prosperity to the quality I have called dynamism and the second piece 
positively linking dynamism in turn to some institutions, e.g., a broad stock 
market, and negatively linking dynamism to some other institutions, e.g., 
licensing requirements on new firms, is, I think, a modest but significant advance. 
I would stress two tenative conclusions from this kind of analysis. First, there is 
considerably more to dynamism, it appears, than private property. Second, 
unemployment is not entirely or mainly the effect of misguided labor-market 
legislation. However, needless to say, this fragmentary evidence cannot speak to 
the whole wide range of issues over reform now facing Europe. 
 
Is there evidence directly associating high performance – that is, prosperity 
and its visible sign, high employment, and high productivity – with the 
presence of institutions believed helpful to dynamism and the absence of 
those believed harmful? Such evidence emerges even with the small sample 
of just 12 large OECD economies. 
 
An informal cross-country analysis of those economies that I have 
conducted with Gylfi Zoega examined three measures of economic 
performance: the employment rate (relative to the working-age population), 
the unemployment rate (relative to labor force), and labor productivity – the 
first two of these measures being observable proxies for job satisfaction, 
personal development for work, etc. Taking one institution at a time, we 
found that university education improves all three measures of economic 
performance: employment, unemployment and productivity too. Another 
institution, the “red tape” impeding innovators, as measured by the OECD 
index of barriers to entrepreneurs, is bad for all three elements of 
performance. Finally, legislation providing a high level of job protection is 
bad for productivity but does not have a clear effect on either employment 
rate or unemployment rate.11 
 
 
Searching for Effects of European Corporatism 
As everyone knows, a system often called “corporatism” took shape in the 
interwar period, specifically from 1925 to 1940, in parts of continental 
Europe, South America and East Asia. The fundamental corporatist idea was 
to retain the private income, private wealth and private ownership of firms 
that was so central to capitalism (and found in avant-garde examples of 
market socialism too) but to remove the brain of capitalism – to curtail and 
to modify the mechanism of experiments and discoveries undertaken by 
                                                          
11  Some of these results are displayed in scatter plots in a commentary (Comment II) appearing in 
Phelps (2003a). 
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unorganized entrepreneurs and financiers on which capitalism relied upon 
for its direction(s) – and to replace it with a selection mechanism governing 
investment and innovation that would require a consensus of key social 
groups. The main allocative decisions, such as the start-up of a firm or its 
close, is to have the approval of the designated groups constituting the 
society. Corporatism sought to interpose the interests of the whole society in 
a range of decisions affecting the directions taken in the business sector. The 
visible structure of this economic system, whatever the main uses to which it 
was actually put in this or that country, had several prominent features – 
nearly comprehensive labor unions, employer confederations, and big banks. 
In the postwar period, workers councils became another distinctive feature 
of the Continental system.12 And a new rhetoric grew up around these 
Continental systems that introduced such terms as “social partners,” 
indicative planning, “co-determination” and concertazione. 
 
As was mentioned in passing above, proponents and designers of the new 
system generally claimed it was inherently superior, at least in the sense of 
potentially preferable, to the capitalist systems then operating because it 
made possible a more rational resource allocation through the opportunities 
it offered for coordination in wage setting, investment decisions and so 
forth. Corporatist theoreticians no less than socialist theoreticians saw it as 
an ex ante advantage of their system that it would or could be an instrument 
for scientific management of the economy. The contrary view that began to 
arise in the 1980s held that corporatism, in setting up machinery to facilitate 
direct interventions over a wide swath of economic decision making, ended 
up giving one or more interest groups a power to veto every proposal for 
progress unless and until a satisfactory bribe was paid.13 And these powerful 
groups were not the Rawlsian least-advantaged and seldom if ever 
represented by far-seeing and selfless statesmen. 
 
I have inclined to the hypothesis that corporatist systems are harmful on 
balance for both productivity and prosperity – all things considered.14 As I and 
some others see it, the peculiar corporatist institutions, to the extent they are still 
present in some Continental economies, do not necessarily block imitation of 
known and uncontroversial advances in other economies – witness the 
Continental “catch up” in the postwar decades. But, it appears to me, the 
corporatist institutions and the corporatist mind-set that motivated their 
establishment do operate to inhibit indigenous innovation. In this hypothesis, to 
the extent that a Continental nation retains vestiges of corporatist institutions and 
                                                          
12  A striking fact uncovered by Rajan and Zingales (2002) is that in most countries of Continental 
Europe  stock market capitalization as a ratio to GDP had by 1980 still not recovered to the zenith 
reached in 1913. 
13  Two of the pioneers were Herbert Giersch and the late Ezio Tarantelli. The former wrote as if the 
medieval guilds were still operative in the West Germany. (Giersch, 1993). The latter on the other 
hand saw a more complex picture in which union “coordination” was beneficial. (Tarantelli, 1986). 
14  My first efforts were in a book (Phelps, 2002a) with a focus on Italy; my latest effort is a lecture 
given at Chatham House (Phelps, 2003c). 
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thinking, these causal influences may appreciably account – more than the 
nation’s welfare state – for the alienation from business, the dearth of innovations, 
and therefore the apparently low levels of job satisfaction, the low participation 
and the generally high unemployment rates that have become familiar on the 
Continent. 
 
Of course, what was left of the corporatist structure in this or that 
Continental economy may in many cases have experienced further changes 
over the second half of the century. So not only is there the difficult task of 
weighing the ill-effects of corporatism against the possible good effect. 
There is also the question is the extent to which the avowedly corporatist 
countries of decades past have moved away – for good or ill – from their 
corporatist mode of operation and corporatist mode of thinking. 
 
Some tentative findings from elementary statistical analyses of the data 
on the 12 large OECD countries are interesting, I think. Gylfi Zoega and I 
found that, among the 12 large OECD nations, a high degree of corporatism 
– as commonly measured by the degree of “coordination” among labour 
unions and among employers – is loosely associated with low employment 
and low productivity. This much is rather widely granted, with Sweden 
being something of an exception, or “outlier.” That finding is just a simple 
correlation analysis of the 12 data points.15 When we allow one or two other 
institutions to enter simultaneously into the analysis – a multiple regression 
analysis – the picture changes. The OECD index of red tape obstructing 
entrepreneurs explains the poorer performance of some of the countries. 
And employment protection legislation is another institution helping to 
explain differences between the good performers and the poor performers. 
But these two institutions, red tape and job protection, are themselves rather 
strongly correlated with corporatism as measured by the coordination 
variable. As a result, when these two institutions, which can be viewed as 
primary effects of corporatism, are included in the analysis, there are no 
remaining differences for the coordination variable to explain. The 
coordination of labour unions and employers does not directly exert a 
negative effect on economic performance. The harms from corporatism 
apparently come more from the ancillary institutions that corporatist 
thinking inspires rather than from coordination per se. It is even possible 
that, with further analysis, the degree of union and employer coordination 
will be found to be a small “plus,” given the other institutions, some of 
which may have a strong corporatist flavor. 
 
It is possible, therefore, that the early theoreticians of corporatism were not 
wrong in claiming a beneficial potential in the brave new system. However, it is 
beginning to appear quite likely that the overall impact of the corporatist system 
and corporatist mind-set have done great harm to Europe’s dynamism and, in turn, 
to its economic performance. 
                                                          




Does Culture Play a Part in Economic Performance? 
With Continental Europe still languishing more than two decades after the 
onslaught of shocks felt in the 1970s and early 1980s and with India, China and 
parts of southeast Asia showing enormous energy and initiative, whatever the 
support and the impediments their economic institutions are bringing, it is not 
unreasonable that economists and non-economists should begin to speculate that 
some as yet undetermined part of the conspicuous inter-country differences in 
current-day participation, investment and so forth may stem from a causal 
influence other than the neoclassical policy differences and the economic 
institutions just discussed: Perhaps differences in culture are an important 
influence on economic performance. 
 
Recently I wondered aloud whether the Continent’s culture must share the 
blame with some of its economic institutions for its economic problem – its dearth 
of prosperity and its less than first-place level of productivity.16 Several points 
sprang to mind. In some European nations there is an expressed uneasiness about 
making money. As Hans Werner Sinn said to me, a German would rather say that 
he inherited his wealth than to say that he had made his fortune. Some Belgian 
businessmen told me they thought Europeans were more risk-averse than 
Americans. There is also the practice of shielding teenagers from any sort of job 
experience or earning any money, so that the business world must seem rather 
foreign to them as they are growing up. It has been suggested that European 
schooling drains children there of some of their playfulness and creativity. There 
is the point that the protection of European culture effectively means protecting 
the older and more established people, which may cause young people to believe 
it is wrong to compete and risk upsetting the established order. I might add that I 
did not suggest that Europeans are deficient in some sort of genetic material. 
(After all, the Americans are largely of European stock.) 
 
These speculations are interesting to me and apparently to nearly everyone. 
The question “Is it economic institutions or culture?” – would make for an almost 
irresistible debate. Yet speculations such as these are met with some ambivalence 
by those economists who think, very plausibly, that economists should specialize 
in finding causes in the areas in which they have expertise, not in areas already 
heavily populated by psychologists and sociologists. And Europeans themselves 
are rather sensitive to suggestions that their culture, which is one of the things of 
which they are most proud, might play a part in their relatively poor economic 
performance. 
 
My research strategy continues to be one focusing not on culture but on 
economic institutions, such as those I have mentioned above and some others. 
This is presumably the strategy in which economists have a comparative 
                                                          
16  See the brief digression in my lecture in Munich (Phelps, 2002b) and a paragraph in a newspaper 
column on Europe’s economic performance and economic institutions (Phelps, 2002c). 
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advantage. We will see to what extent we can explain in the statistical sense the 
differences in (proxies for) economic performance among European countries and 
between the Continent on the one hand and, on the other, the United States and 
other salient comparators. Perhaps this venture will fail for the very reason that 
culture is the greater determinant of the degree of dynamism and thus economic 
performance. Or, almost as bad, we may find that institution choices by countries 
appear to be the cause of differences in economic performance but these 
institutional differences across countries are mere reflections of differences in 
culture whose primary influence is direct, not through institutions. 
 
But this seems to me to be assuming what is to be proved. Maybe culture has 
no independent influence that will defeat or invalidate such an analysis. It could 
be that when the institutions are right, jobs are engaging, business is exciting and 
the culture evolves to recognize and reinforce the gratifications of a healthy 
business life. Where the economic institutions are receptive and conducive, the 
“entreprenurial spirit” comes to life. 
 
The challenge presented by a rival cause, culture, is not the only challenge 
that this institutional research faces. It has been suggested that institutions lack the 
sort of exogeneity that would qualify them to be causal forces in the etiology of 
healthy and sick economies. My reply is that countries have little idea of what is 
the best set of economic institutions for them. Rats, psychologists say, look 
around to see how other rats do after eating suspicious foods. No doubt, countries 
also try to engage in such “social learning,” sometimes adopting an institution 
because it is presumed to be good choice in view of the satisfactory performance 
estimated to be obtained in some other countries that adopted the same institution. 
 
But, obviously, when institutions are manifold and connected in networks, 
such inferences are highly uncertain. To me there seems to be an enormous 
amount of arbitrariness in each country’s network of institutions. (Of course, if all 
Continental economies simply copy one another’s institutions, statistical analysis 
cannot proceed, even if the chosen set of institutions is exogenous to the whole 
sample of countries. However, that is a different proposition.) 
 
Another objection, which is best faced right now, starts from the contrary 
premise that institutions do not change from one decade or even milieu to the next 
and yet, very typically, a country has a golden age at one time and tough sledding 
in another. (Maybe a country’s set of institutions has evolved in such a way as to 
be good on the average, so it looks good in one era and looks bad in another.) 
This objection observes that the Continent’s rapid growth and high employment 
were the envy of the world in the postwar decades – only a few decades ago, 
when the Continent had much the same economic institutions as now. It is a 
mistake, therefore, to infer that Continental institutions are at fault now for the 
difficulties in which most of the large Continental economies have found 
themselves in the past twenty years. 
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But, obviously or not, this argument must first establish that the institutions 
on the Continent during the “glorious years” from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s 
were indeed good. And that is not established. To rush to the inference that the 
Continent’s institutions were good in those years would be to overlook the 
unusual market forces operating in that period. After the rubble of the war-torn 
countries was finally cleared away and the bricks and tracks all put back together, 
the Continent found itself with a one-time opportunity to catch up with the 
technical progress that it taken place in the American economy during the 1930s 
and 1940s (and in a sector of the Japanese economy later on). The fact that the 
Continent’s set of economic institutions was not obstructive enough to block the 
extensive – though part-way – catch-up in that extraordinary situation, with its 
low-hanging fruit ready to be plucked at low cost, does not disprove that some of 
the Continent’s economic institutions are unfavorable to dynamism, as 
hypothesized here. Institutions that are good enough for imitation and part-way 
catch-up (starting from a yawning gap) may not be good enough to generate a 
creative business sector of considerable and well-chosen indigenous innovation. 
The logical slip in the objection is that it mistakes the rapid growth rate and 
ensuing rise of employment to record levels in the glorious years with an 
economy structured for high economic performance in normal as well as 
unusually opportune times. (Of course, such a structure does not deliver 
unfluctuating growth and employment.) 
 
A similar rebuttal applies to a mistaken analysis of China. The fact that 
China’s present set of economic institutions is not so obstructive as to block the 
extensive – though part-way – catch-up with the West now seemingly underway 
does not suggest that those institutions could even begin to support an economy of 
dynamism in China were the low-hanging fruit of technology transfer and 
partnerships with foreign corporations not present. To say this, though, is not to 
deny that China has in fact fashioned some new institutions peculiar to China to 
facilitate catch-up with the West. It has invented new ways of achieving 
entrepreneurialism. So the Chinese institutions are a hugely interesting case to 
study. 
 
In sum, I see no compelling reason to be so pessimistic as not to try to 
understand the influence on various economies of their prevailing economic 
institutions. Possibly we do well to take as largely or appreciably exogenous each 
country’s set of economic institutions – many of which are historical accidents 
and in no way optimal even if deliberately chosen. And possibly we do well not to 
be deterred by leaps of inference about sui generis episodes that may be total 
misreadings. It could be that we are quite right to hypothesize that the stock of 
institutions is the primary cause – or at any rate a primary cause – of the degree of 
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